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Abstract	
The	article	expands	existing	categorisation	of	political	and	economic	governance	
by	 including	 literature	on	 less	developed	countries	 (LDCs).	 In	 four	 consecutive	
negotiations	 between	 the	 US	 multinational	 Kaisers	 and	 the	 US	 and	 Ghana	
government	 in	 the	early	1960s,	 it	 is	 shown	that	 the	company	reached	 levels	of	
influence	 that	 are	 at	 odds	 with	 existing	 explanations.	 In	 order	 to	 understand	
corporate	political	activities	 in	LDCs,	analysis	needs	to	go	beyond	static	 factors	
(political	 risk)	 and	 include	 dynamic	 factors	 such	 as	 diplomatic	 relations	 and	
‘arenas	of	power’,	and	consider	the	role	of	the	investor’s	home	country	relative	
to	the	host	economy.		
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The	 nature	 and	 extent	 of	 corporate	 political	 power	 is	 a	 controversial	 issue	
particularly	 in	 less	 developed	 countries.	 Often	 the	 size	 of	 major	 international	
companies	is	compared	with	that	of	African	countries	–	which,	due	to	 its	 faulty	
methodology,	does	not	really	address	the	question	adequately	(Dicken,	2007,	pp.	
232‐233).	 The	 significant	 political	 power	 differential	 between	 developed	 and	
less	 developed	 countries	 suggests	 that	 the	 political	 power	 held	 by	 the	 home	
economy	 translates	 directly	 into	 economic	 power	 for	 its	 multinational	
companies	 (MNCs),	 i.e.	 an	extension	of	 the	 “gunboat	diplomacy”	 argument.	Yet	
there	are	also	surprising	cases	of	corporate	impotence,	for	example	in	the	recent	
Chad‐Cameroon	 Oil	 Pipeline	 Project	 (Gould	 &	 Winters,	 2007).	 MNCs	 like	 to	
highlight	their	vulnerability	relative	to	the	power	of	sovereign	countries	on	such	
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occasions,	 in	 effect	 seeing	 business	 influence	 as	 directly	 proportional	 to	 the	
degree	goodwill	and	acceptance	of	the	host	economy.	
Both	arguments	 in	effect	embed	business	power	either	 in	 the	conditions	of	 the	
home	or	the	host	economy.	This	means	that	foreign	companies	from	developed	
economies	 as	 a	 group	 should	 have	 been	 either	 highly	 effective	 in	 influencing	
policy	 in	 states	 that	 displayed	 significant	 economic	 nationalism,	 or	 have	 very	
little	power	as	a	group.	Economic	nationalism,	in	this	case	defined	as	hostility	to	
foreign	 investment,	 was	 common	 in	 less	 developed	 countries	 (LDCs)	 in	 the	
1960s	 and	 1970s.	 Ghana	 under	 Kwame	 Nkrumah	 (1957‐1966)	 was	 a	 well‐
known	 case	 at	 the	 time	 because	 of	 the	 political	 importance	 that	 the	 USA	
attributed	to	the	first	sub‐Saharan	colony	that	achieved	independence.	And	while	
Nkrumah	was	suspicious	of	corporate	influence,	both	domestic	and	foreign,	but	
required	 foreign	 assistance	 for	 his	 ambitious	 development	 plans,	 there	 was	 a	
grudging	 acceptance	 of	 foreign	 investment	 if	 foreign	 influence	 could	 be	
contained	(Esseks,	1971;	T.	Jones,	1976,	p.	162;	Killick,	1978,	pp.	37‐38).	
Nevertheless,	the	nature	of	corporate	political	power	in	Nkrumah’s	Ghana	does	
not	easily	 fit	 either	 scenario	of	 corporate	power	or	 impotence.	The	majority	of	
foreign	firms	at	the	time	were	British,	with	some	relatively	recent	US	American,	
French	and	West	German	investment.	Their	influence	on	policy	was	modest,	and	
declined	 in	 this	 time	 period.	 This	 seems	 to	 confirm	 the	 argument	 that	 host	
country	 attitudes	 towards	 foreign	 investment	 is	 more	 significant	 than	 home	
country	power.	There	was	one	notable	exception	to	this,	which	was	the	US	firm	
Kaiser	 Industries	 and	 its	 subsidiary,	 Kaiser	 Aluminum	 &	 Chemicals	 Company	
(KACC),	which	had	enormous	influence	on	policy	in	Ghana,	especially	in	the	time	
period	 from	 1959	 to	 1963:	 “Kaisers	 is	 more	 influential	 in	 Ghana	 than	 the	 US	
government,”2	 one	 observer	 remarked.	 This	 cannot	 easily	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	
greater	 power	 of	 the	USA	 relative	 to	 European	 states,	 because	 US	 relations	 to	
Ghana	were	 strained	 at	 the	 time.	Moreover,	 in	 1962,	 another	 US	 investor,	 the	
flour	 manufacturer	 Pillsbury,	 quickly	 found	 that	 the	 government	 of	 Ghana	
reneged	on	its	assurances.3	
This	 leaves	historians	with	 the	conclusion	that	Kaisers’	 influence	 in	Ghana	was	
contingent	 on	 its	 strategic	 position	 in	 US‐Ghanaian	 investment	 plans,	 and	 the	
extremely	 close	 and	 cordial	 relationship	 that	 existed	 between	Ghana’s	 head	 of	
state	and	Kaisers’	president	Edgar	Kaiser,	and	vice‐president	Chad	Calhoun	(as	
described	in	Moxon,	1969,	1984).	But	this	explanation	is	equally	unsatisfactory,	
because	although	the	relationship	remained	cordial,	Kaisers’	 influence	declined	
noticeably	 after	 1963.	 The	 obsolescing	 bargain	model	 (Penrose,	 1959;	Vernon,	
1973)	has	explained	this	in	terms	of	the	erosion	of	bargaining	power	of	foreign	
companies	 once	 their	 investment	 was	 sunk.	 However,	 in	 1963	 Kaisers’	
investment	had	been	agreed	but	was	not	“sunk”	(construction	did	not	begin	until	
1965)	and	the	terms	of	their	bargain	never	obsolesced	either.	
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What	 I	 propose	 is	 a	 different	 explanation,	 in	 which	 the	 power	 of	 individual	
multinationals	 is	dependent,	 to	 some	extent,	on	 their	 capabilities	 for	 corporate	
political	 activities,	 but	 more	 importantly	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	host	and	home	economies.	Similar	arguments	have	been	advanced	for	
North	 American	 investment	 in	 Central	 America	 (Bucheli,	 2008,	 2010;	 Haber,	
Maurer,	 &	 Razo,	 2003)	 Individual	MNCs	 become	 unusually	 powerful	 in	 a	 very	
visible	way	not	 for	accidental	reasons,	but	because	they	can	take	the	role	of	an	
intermediary	channel	of	corporate	diplomacy.		Forbes	Magazine	went	so	far	as	to	
describe	 Edgar	 Kaiser	 as	 “the	 only	 link	 between	 the	 US	 and	 Ghanaian	
governments”	in	1961,	due	to	his	skills	in	dealing	with	“prickly	foreigners”	(cited	
from	 Forbes	 in	 Graham,	 1982,	 pp.	 238‐239,	 FN	 67).	 In	 a	 situation	 where	
diplomatic	 relations	 between	 host	 and	 home	 country	 are	 tense,	 yet	 some	
rapprochement,	 especially	 by	 the	 home	 country	 of	 the	 investor,	 is	 still	 being	
sought,	 companies	 that	 capture	 a	position	as	 corporate	politicians	 can	become	
unusually	powerful.		
Existing	 theories	 of	 have	 focused	 on	 categorising	 either	 corporate	 political	
strategies	or	host	country	economic	strategies.	However	the	role	played	by	the	
home	 country	 government	 has	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 connected	 with	 host	
economy	conditions.	Kaisers	managed	a	complex	web	of	political	networks	that	
stretched	from	Washington	to	Accra	and	that	involved	negotiating	the	cognitive	
distortion	of	the	Cold	War	era.	The	political	strategies	employed	have	to	be	seen	
in	 their	 international	 political	 and	 economic	 context.	 Thus	 Kaiser’s	 political	
influence	 in	 Washington,	 together	 with	 the	 unstable	 political	 environment	 in	
Ghana,	 opened	 up	 political	 opportunities.	 Also	 significant	 was	 the	 industry	
context:	The	aluminium	industry	was	globally	oligopolistic	and	renowned	for	its	
close	 relationship	 to	 national	 governments,	 especially	 in	 the	 US,	 the	 UK	 and	
France,	 because	 of	 its	 strategic	 relevance	 (Hove,	 forthcoming;	 Perchard,	 2008,	
2010).		
This	 article	 seeks	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 literature	 by	 integrating	 the	 business	
history	and	political	science	of	Africa	with	work	on	corporate	political	activities	
(CPA)	 from	 international	 business	 and	 strategy	 (see	 also	 Bucheli,	 2008).	 The	
emergent	field	of	African	business	history,	which	has	recently	been	reviewed	in	
Business	History	Review	(Tignor,	2007),	has	traditionally	been	under‐researched	
compared	to	Latin	American	or	Asian	enterprise	–	note	the	absence	of	a	chapter	
in	 Business	 History	 around	 the	World	 (2003).	 Nevertheless,	 there	 has	 been	 a	
diverse	range	of	publications	on	the	subject	in	the	last	few	years	(Austin	&	Uche,	
2007;	 Decker,	 2010;	 Mager,	 2008;	 Maltby	 &	 Tsamenyi,	 2010;	 Piquet,	 2004	 ;	
Verhoef,	 2008).	 As	 Antony	 Hopkins	 argued	 recently	 (Hopkins,	 2010),	 the	 key	
issue	for	Africa	is	still	poverty,	and	economic	history	should	reflect	this	concern.	
Hence	business	history	should	address	questions	such	as	in	how	far	companies	
contributed	 to	 development,	 and	 how	 much	 influence	 they	 wielded	 in	 their	
relationship	to	government.	The	contribution	to	the	literature	on	CPA	is	twofold.	
By	integrating	research	on	Africa,	I	extended	some	existing	matrices	of	political	
economy	systems	 to	better	 represent	 conditions	 in	LDCs	 (Table	1).	 Secondly,	 I	
propose	to	combine	the	policies	of	home	countries	with	those	of	the	host	country	
in	order	to	establish	a	dynamic	model	of	corporate	political	activities	(Figure	1).	
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I. Researching corporate political strategies 
How	 influential	was	Kaisers	during	 the	Nkrumah	years?	How	does	business	 in	
general	influence	policy	in	Africa?	There	has	hardly	been	any	work	on	the	nature	
of	corporate	political	activity	in	Africa,	other	than	Rodney	(1972),	Rood	(1976),	
and	 Widstrand	 (1975).	 Much	 of	 the	 literature	 either	 employs	 an	 explicitly	
Marxist	 analysis,	 or	 tends	 to	 deal	 quite	 descriptively	 with	 the	 legal	 and	
administrative	 factors	 relevant	 to	 the	 expropriation	 drives	 of	 the	 1970s.	
Moreover,	 they	 frequently	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 states’	 economic	 activity	
rather	than	the	private	sector’s	political	activity	(see	for	example	Wilson,	1990).	
There	 is	 little	 clear	 conceptualisation	 of	 corporate	 influence	 on	 the	 political	
processes,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 dependency	 literature	 in	 Latin	 America.	 Yet	 even	
dependency	authors	focus	more	on	governments’	economic	policies	that	seek	to	
curb	the	 influence	of	foreign	direct	 investment	(Gereffi	&	Evans,	1981)	than	on	
the	detailed	corporate	strategies	geared	towards	gaining	political	influence.		
In	contrast,	corporate	political	activity	has	received	a	lot	of	interest	in	business	
studies	 since	 the	 1990s,	 especially	 from	 a	 strategic	 management	 perspective.	
This	 reflects	 the	 rising	 importance	 of	 emerging	 economies	 in	 international	
business,	 where	 political	 activity	 is	 relatively	 more	 important	 to	 business	
success	 than	 competitive	market	 position	 (Peng,	 2003).	Hillman	&	Hitt	 (1999)	
proposed	 a	 three	 stage	model	 that	 differentiates	 strategic	 choices	of	 corporate	
political	activity	(CPA),	which	provides	a	useful	framework:	
1. Two	general	approaches:	transactional	or	relational	
2. Two	levels	of	participation:	individual	or	collective	
3. Three	 types	 of	 generic	 political	 strategies:	 information,	 financial	
incentive,	and	constituency	building	
A	 firm’s	 decision‐making	 could	 be	 determined	 either	 by	 its	 internal	 corporate	
preference,	or	by	 responding	 to	 its	 local	environment.	 In	a	multi‐level	 study	of	
institutional	 duality	 of	multinationals	 in	 present‐day	Western	 Europe,	 Hillman	
and	Wan	(2005)	found	greater	support	for	local	responsiveness	than	corporate	
preference.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 relate	 strategic	 choices	 to	 the	 political	
economy	within	which	they	take	place.	
Murtha	 and	 Lenway	 (1994)	 conceptualised	 the	 state	 as	 a	 strategic	 actor.	 They	
argue	that	the	credibility	of	its	policies	is	inversely	related	to	its	target	specificity	
(i.e.	 whether	 government	 can	 control	 individual	 economic	 transactions	 or	 just	
sets	 broad	 industry	 or	 national	 conditions).	 This	 means	 the	 more	 power	 and	
opportunity	 a	 state	 has	 to	 determine	 the	 outcome	 of	 specific	 economic	
transactions,	 the	 lower	 its	 credibility	 will	 be,	 because	 political	 negotiations	
would	trump	general	market	rationality,	making	the	outcome	less	predictable.	As	
a	 result,	 the	 authors	 develop	 a	 matrix	 of	 political	 regimes,	 which	 combines	
transactional	 governance	 (market	 vs.	 central	 planning)	 with	 the	 nature	 of	
property	 rights	 (public	 vs.	 private).	 While	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 planned	 command	
economy	 (central	 planning	 with	 public	 ownership)	 is	 relevant	 for	 Eastern	
European	transition	economies,	it	is	not	helpful	to	understand	the	conditions	in	
less	developed	economies.	Therefore	I	suggest	a	different	categorisation,	which	
focuses	 on	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 political	 system,	 which	 is	 only	 imperfectly	
correlated	to	public	ownership	of	resources	(see	Table	1).	
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Table	1:	Corporate	legitimacy	and	political	systems	
	 Political	system
Transactional	
governance	
Patronage
(relational,	insecure	property	rights)	
Pluralistic	
(rule‐based,	secure	property	rights)	
Coordination		  Government	involvement	in	
economic	organisation	
 Influence	through	personal	
connections	
 Most	LDCs	
 Ghana	under	Nkrumah	
 Government	involvement	in	economic	
organisation	
 Influence	constrained	by	impersonal	
decentralisation	of	power	
 Coordinated	market	economies	
Market	  Government	avoids	interference	in	
economy	beyond	basic	policies	
 Influence	through	personal	
connections	
 Transition	&	emerging	
economies	
 Government	avoids	interference	in	
economy	beyond	basic	policies	
 Influence	constrained	by	impersonal	
decentralisation	of	power	
 Liberal	market	economies	
 US		(although	at	mid‐century	
some	economic	coordination)	
Note:	Developed	on	the	basis	of	Murtha	&	Lenway	(1994),	Guillen	(2000),	Peng	
(2003),	Soskice	&	Hall	(2001).	
The	 most	 significant	 difference	 between	 developed	 and	 many	 developing	
countries	 is	 that	 social	 and	 political	 relations	 in	 African	 states	 are	 based	 on	
patronage	 networks	 (Bayart,	 1993;	 Chabal	 &	 Daloz,	 1999),	 and	 this	 opens	
avenues	 for	 negotiation	 and	 influence	 on	 a	 personal	 level.	 Unsurprisingly,	
companies	respond	by	opting	 for	an	 individual,	 relational	approach	 to	political	
relations	that	may	be	coupled	with	an	information	or	a	financial	strategy	option.	
This	is	supported	by	findings	from	Bates	(1981)	for	Africa,	who	highlighted	the	
existence	 of	 “coalitions	 between	 sectors	 of	 society,	 including	 industry	 and	
government”,	and	Evans’	(1979)	argument	of	a	triple	alliance	in	Brazil	between	
government	and	domestic	and	foreign	business.		
However,	in	the	case	of	Kaiser,	their	political	strategy	choices	are	the	same	in	the	
US,	which	may	reflect	a	strong	corporate	preference,	as	it	is	difficult	to	argue	that	
the	 political	 environment	 was	 similar	 to	 Ghana.	 Why	 are	 Kaisers’	 political	
strategy	 choices	 fundamentally	 similar	 in	 Ghana	 and	 US	 when	 the	 political	
economy	context	was	so	markedly	different?	At	mid‐century,	the	USA	showed	a	
more	coordinated	pattern	in	its	economic	governance	than	Table	1	suggests.	Yet	
it	is	Kaisers’	privileged	position	in	both	Washington	and	Accra	at	a	time	when	the	
relationship	between	Ghana	and	the	US	was	strained	that	seems	to	have	elevated	
the	firm	to	the	status	of	a	“corporate	diplomat”,	who	mediated	between	different	
mindsets.		
Some	 concepts	 from	 political	 science	 and	 economics	 are	 helpful	 in	
understanding	 the	 case	 of	 Kaisers	 in	 the	 US	 and	 Ghana.	 The	 visibility	 problem	
highlights	 that	 large	 firms	 may	 be	 wary	 of	 exerting	 too	 much	 influence	 too	
openly	in	order	to	avoid	a	backlash	in	public	opinion,	and	also	creates	pressures	
to	make	credible	claims	and	commitments.	However,	Bernhagen	and	Braeuniger	
(2005)	 show	 that	 companies	 are	 sometimes	 able	 to	 use	 visibility	 to	 their	
advantage.	They	argue	 that	 the	 crucial	 factor	here	 is	 information	asymmetry:	 if	
policy	makers	lack	information	and	consider	the	risk	of	adverse	effects	too	high,	
they	will	accept	business	demands.	Kaisers’	position	as	mediator	meant	that	the	
company	had	superior	information	that	both	governments	were	keen	to	access.	
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In	a	contemporary	piece	on	the	US	political	economy,	Lowi	(1964,	pp.	690‐713)	
highlighted	 that	 the	 pattern	 of	 political	 influences	 differed	 between	 so‐called	
“arenas	 of	 power”,	 of	 which	 he	 identified	 three:	 distributive,	 regulatory,	 and	
redistributive.	 Distributive	 policies	 here	 refer	 to	 political	 patronage	 in	 the	
broadest	sense,	where	political	decisions	can	be	disaggregated	and	dispensed	in	
small	 and	 isolated	units,	 irrespective	of	 a	 general	 rule,	where	 the	beneficiaries	
and	the	losers	never	need	to	come	into	direct	confrontation.	This	type	of	policy	is	
a	 typical	 feature	of	 less	developed	states,	as	well	as	resource	policies,	and	thus	
highly	 relevant	 for	 this	 case.	 In	 the	 regulatory	 arena,	 general	 rules	 that	 favour	
one	group	over	another	are	created,	and	can	only	be	disaggregated	to	a	sectoral	
level,	 not	 to	 that	 of	 an	 individual	 firm.	 Redistributive	 policies	 determine	 the	
relationship	between	social	classes,	such	as	taxation	or	welfare	programmes,	and	
are	determined	strongly	by	ideological	positions.	Of	these	three	arenas,	the	first	
and	 last	 are	most	 relevant	 to	 the	 present	 case:	 in	 the	 distributive	 arena,	 firms	
were	 most	 likely	 to	 act	 individually	 and	 achieve	 high	 degrees	 of	 influence	 on	
isolated	 issues,	 while	 their	 influence	 in	 the	 redistributive	 arena,	 i.e.	 taxation,	
tended	to	be	more	limited	and	based	on	collective	action.	
None	of	the	authors	mentioned	above	were	considering	this	in	an	international	
context	 of	 diplomacy	 and	 foreign	 direct	 investment.	 Much	 of	 the	 existing	
literature	 in	 international	business	has	 focused	on	the	host	country	conditions,	
especially	 the	 level	 of	 political	 risk.	 Yet	 Haber,	 Maurer	 &	 Razo	 (2003)	 have	
argued	for	the	case	of	US	 investment	 in	Mexico	that	changes	 in	 formal	political	
institutions	 had	 no	 effect	 corporate	 investment	 decisions	 as	 long	 as	 firms	 had	
diplomatic	 leverage	 to	 counteract	 them.	 Bucheli	 (2009)	 shows	 that	 home	
country	conditions	significantly	affect	corporate	political	activities	in	the	case	of	
Canadian	 investment	 in	 Colombia.	 Both	 studies	 highlight	 dynamic	 factors	 that	
are	 broadly	 absent	 in	 the	 more	 static	 models	 of	 international	 business	 and	
political	science.	
Figure	1:	Home	and	host	countries’	dynamic	and	static	conditions	affecting	
the	degree	of	corporate	influence	
	
What	 the	model	 in	 figure	1	predicts	 is	 that	static	 factors,	such	as	high	 levels	of	
political	 risk	 or	 corporate	 visibility	 do	 not	 in	 themselves	 predict	 the	 level	 of	
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corporate	influence	or	security	of	property	rights.	Haber,	Maurer	&	Razo	(2003)	
make	 a	 similar	 argument	 from	 a	 neo‐institutional	 perspective,	 distinguishing	
between	formal	and	informal	institutions.	Here	I	distinguish	between	static	and	
dynamic	factors,	which	operate	at	host	as	well	as	at	home	country	level.	I	argue	
that	it	is	the	dynamic	factors	that	can	turn	high	visibility	and	political	risk	into	an	
advantage,	 as	 was	 the	 case	 for	 Kaisers	 in	 the	 first	 three	 instances	 (III.1,	 III.2,	
III.3),	but	also	into	a	disadvantage,	as	the	final	case	(III.4)	shows.	This	does	not	
remove	agency,	 as	Kaisers’	 keen	awareness	of	 the	 shifting	political	 tides	 led	 to	
distinct	 departure	 in	 their	 political	 activities	 in	 1964,	 which	 became	 more	
defensive	and	geared	towards	reducing	visibility.	The	subsequent	narrative	will	
demonstrate	 how	 significant	 international	 diplomacy	 and	 a	 shift	 from	 a	
distributive	 to	 a	 redistributive	political	 arena	 are	 in	 understanding	 the	 case	 of	
Kaisers	in	Ghana.	
	
II. Contextual factors: The United States in Ghana in the 1950s and 1960s 
II.1 Kaisers in the US 
The	 Kaisers	 group	 of	 companies	 were	 frequently	 described	 as	 ‘government	
entrepreneurs’	 (Adams,	 1997)	 which	 to	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 founder,	 Henry	 J	
Kaiser.	 A	 famous	 businessman	 in	 the	 US,	 his	 meteoric	 rise	 on	 the	 American	
corporate	scene	really	began	with	his	company’s	collaboration	in	the	consortium	
that	built	the	Hoover	dam.	Subsequently	his	firms	were	involved	in	one	way	or	
another	 in	 the	 major	 New	 Deal	 dam	 building	 projects	 (Mayo,	 Enson,	 &	 Chen,	
2008).	This	rapid	expansion	was	made	possible	by	close	contacts	to	government	
officials	 in	 Washington,	 showing	 a	 corporate	 preference	 for	 an	 individual‐
relational	approach	to	CPA.	
The	 effectiveness	 of	 Kaisers’	 political	 strategy	 raises	 the	 question	whether	 the	
classification	 of	 the	US	 as	 a	 pluralistic	market	 economy	 according	 to	Table1	 is	
entirely	accurate.	 In	the	1950s	and	1960s,	business	power	was	clearly	relevant	
in	 certain	 ‘arenas’	 and	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 decisions	 that	were	 linked	 to	
government	backing	such	as	the	VRP	was	part	of	the	distributive	arena,	in	which	
individual	 companies	 could	 gain	 significant	 influence	 on	 isolated	 issues	 (Lowi,	
1964).	
Kaiser’s	political	involvement	in	Ghana,	and	almost	to	the	same	extent	in	the	US,	
can	 be	 categorised	 as	 relational	 and	 individual,	 with	 a	 generic	 information	
strategy.	 There	 is	 no	 evidence	 of	 financial	 incentives,	 either	 legal	 or	 illegal,	
beyond	the	normal	hosting	of	business	partners,	and	only	rudimentary	attempts	
at	constituency	building	within	a	narrow	range	of	professionals	directly	related	
to	 the	 project.	 Kaiser’s	 choices	 in	 Ghana	 are	 neither	 surprising	 nor	
fundamentally	different	from	the	rest	of	the	business	community	(for	an	example	
see	Moxon,	 1969,	 1984,	 p.	 269),	 but	 suggest	 that	 the	USA	 at	mid‐century	may	
need	to	be	treated	as	a	more	coordinated	market	economy.	
	
Figure	2:	Edgar	E	Kaiser	
		 7
	
Source:	(Kaiser	Corporation,	1968,	p.	63)	
Yet	Kaisers’	 success	 in	 the	VRP	was	as	much	due	 to	 the	 company’s	 strategy	 to	
internationalise.	Henry	Kaiser’s	son	Edgar	F	Kaiser	(Figure	2)	became	involved	
early	in	the	rapidly	expanding	conglomerate.	When	Henry	Kaiser	retired	in	1959,	
Edgar	 took	over.	He	 focused	on	taking	 the	Kaiser	companies	abroad,	especially	
Kaiser	Engineers	(KE)	and	Kaisers	Aluminium	and	Chemicals	Company	(KACC),	
the	 latter	 the	 largest	 of	 the	 Kaiser	 companies	 by	 sales,	 assets	 and	 employees	
(Hart,	1980,	p.	48).		
	
Figure	 3:	 Edgar	 Kaiser	 and	 his	 successor	 Cornell	 Maier	 with	 the	
Development	Award,	1974	
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Source:	(Stein,	1980,	p.	184)		
Kaisers’	 involvement	 in	 the	 VRP	 raised	 their	 visibility	 internationally.	 In	 1974	
they	 received	 the	 first	 Development	 Award	 from	 the	 Overseas	 Private	
Development	 Corporation	 (Figure	 2)	 for	 their	 “contribution	 to	 the	 social	 and	
economic	development	of	Ghana,	and	the	success	of	Valco”	(Stein,	1980,	p.	185).	
Nkrumah’s	 friendship	 with	 Edgar	 Kaisers,	 and	 especially	 with	 the	 company’s	
Vice	President,	Chad	Calhoun,	seemed	to	be	sincere,	as	well	as	his	admiration	for	
the	company	founder,	Henry	J	Kaiser.	Calhoun	even	likened	the	two:	“So	much	he	
[Nkrumah]	is	like	H.J.	[Kaiser]	–	always	with	vision	–	thinking	ahead.”	The	older	
Kaiser	would	have	been	less	enthusiastic	about	this	statement,	as	he	considered	
the	Ghanaian	president	a	communist.	4	Without	doubt	Kaisers	gained	significant	
strategic	 advantages	 from	 their	 highly	 personalised,	 relational	 approach	 to	
political	 contacts	 domestically	 and	 internationally,	 at	 a	 time	 when	 diplomatic	
links	were	rather	tenuous,	but	both	governments	sought	a	rapprochement.	
	
II.2 The US policy towards Ghana and decolonizing Africa  
The	 US	 government	 involvement	 in	 the	 VRP	 has	 to	 be	 viewed	 both	 in	
terms	of	their	concern	for	communist	influence	in	the	newly	decolonized	
states	 in	 Africa	 and	 Asia	 (Connelly,	 2000).	 Highly	 visible,	 large‐scale	
development	projects	served	a	distinct	function	in	this	context,	as	the	US	
																																																								
4	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	21.2.63,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	10;	“Notes	of	meeting	at	Accra,	Ghana,	4‐5	
Oct	1961	of	Edgar	Kaiser,	Chad	Calhoun	with	Nkrumah”,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4;	Calhoun	“A	
report,	comments	and	observations	of	Trip	to	Ghana	Sept	18‐23,	1962”,	BANC	
MSS	87/35c	,	Ctn	42,	fl.	9.	Edgar	to	Henry	J.	Kaiser,	28.12.61,	BANC	MSS	83/42c	
[Henry	J	Kaiser	papers],	Ctn.	173,	fl.	1.	
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perceived	the	TVA	as	a	successful	model	and	potential	“weapon”	against	
communism	(Smith,	2006,	p.	250).	
In	1961	Fortune	magazine	compared	the	VRP	to	the	TVA:	
“In	 the	 religion	 of	 the	 new	 nationalism,	 a	 dam	 is	 the	 grandest	 temple,	
promising	miracles	in	industrial	development	and	richer	living.	The	TVA,	
probably	 more	 than	 any	 other	 American	 material	 achievement,	 has	
impressed	and	tantalized	the	emerging	nations	of	Asia	and	Africa,	stirring	
hopes	of	constructing	similar	monumental	projects	on	their	own	rivers.”	
(Siekman,	1961)	
The	successes	and	failures	of	the	TVA	featured	prominently	in	the	thinking	of	the	
US	 administration	 during	 the	 negotiation	 of	 the	 VRP	 (Moxon,	 1969,	 1984,	 p.	
110).	 This	 “embodiment	 of	 progress”	 (Hart,	 1980),	 built	 by	 construction	
companies	 like	Kaiser	Engineers,	became	epitomes	of	 the	post‐war	export	of	 a	
New	Deal‐influenced	vision	of	modernisation	which	was	employed	as	a	Cold	War	
weapon	(Smith,	2006,	p.	19).		
As	 Connelly	 (2000)	 argued,	 the	 Eisenhower	 administration	 was	 far	 more	
concerned	 with	 avoiding	 a	 potential	 North‐South	 conflict	 with	 the	 emerging	
nations	than	has	hitherto	been	assumed,	and	the	initiation	of	the	revised	VRP	is	a	
good	 example	 of	 this.	 The	 Eisenhower	 administration	 approached	 Kaisers	 to	
help	breathe	new	 life	 into	 the	VRP,	which	had	been	shelved	by	 the	UK	and	the	
aluminium	companies	(Noer,	1984,	pp.	62‐63;	The	Economist,	1956).	The	failure	
of	the	West	with	regard	to	the	Aswan	dam,	which	was	built	with	the	help	of	the	
Soviet	Union,	weighed	heavily	 in	 the	decision	of	policymakers	not	 to	 let	Ghana	
“go	communist”	(Noer,	1984,	p.	64)	.	
The	VRP	represented	the	Western,	 capitalist	model	of	progress	 that	was	based	
on	free	enterprise.5	Private	enterprise	was	also	 instrumental	 in	maintaining	US	
government’s	commitment	at	critical	points	in	the	VRP	negotiations,	when	their	
irritation	 at	 Nkrumah’s	 increasingly	 pro‐Soviet	 rhetoric	 intensified.	 The	 State	
Department	 was	 becoming	 highly	 critical	 by	 1961,	 and	 requested	 from	 Edgar	
Kaiser	 and	 Chad	 Calhoun	 confirmation	 of	 reports	 from	 the	 US	 embassy	 that	
Nkrumah	 had	 become	 “slovenly	 and	 dirty	 in	 dress	 and	 habits,	 etc.”.	 The	
businessmen	 roundly	 rejected	 this:	 “If	 anything,	 we	 noted	 that	 he	 was	 more	
neatly	 and	 nattily	 dressed	 ‐	 ‐	 well‐tailored	 clothes.	 Everything	 about	 him	
reflected	just	the	opposite	of	the	reports.”6		
Kaisers’	 role	 became	 increasingly	 that	 of	 a	 ‘corporate	 diplomat’	 in	 the	 time	
period	from	1959	to	1963	as	a	result	of	the	incompatible	international	policies	of	
the	US	and	Ghana.	This	can	only	be	understood	in	the	context	of	the	assessment	
by	 the	 Eisenhower	 and	 Kennedy	 administrations	 that	 Ghana,	 as	 the	 first	 sub‐
Saharan	 African	 country	 to	 become	 independent,	 formed	 an	 important	 part	 of	
																																																								
5	“Power	for	an	Emerging	Nation”,	Newsfront:	Management’s	News	Magazine,	
February	1967,	BANC	MSS	85/61c	[Edgar	F.	Kaiser	papers],	Ctn.	200,	folder	12.	
6	“Notes	of	meeting	at	Accra,	Ghana,	4‐5	Oct	1961	of	Edgar	Kaiser,	Chad	Calhoun	
with	Nkrumah”,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4.	
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their	future	Africa	policy.	Thus	diplomatic	rapprochement	was	sought	in	the	time	
period	from	1957	to	1964.	
While	 in	 1961	 there	 were	 still	 voices	 in	 the	 US	 press	 commenting	 that	 “the	
Nkrumahs	and	Nassers	are	moderates	in	the	African	context”,	by	1964	criticism	
of	 Nkrumah	 had	 reached	 a	 fever	 pitch	 in	 response	 to	 anti‐American	 riots	 and	
demonstrations	 (see	 Figure	 4).7	 Lyndon	 B	 Johnson’s	 administration	 pursued	 a	
more	antagonistic	Cold	War	policy	than	Kennedy	or	Eisenhower,	who	were	more	
concerned	with	anti‐imperial	North‐South	issues	(Connelly,	2000).	
Figure	4:	US	press	representation	of	Kwame	Nkrumah,	1964	
	
Source:	 “Statue	 of	 liberty,	 Ghana	 Design”,	 Sunday	 Star,	Washington	 DC,	 9.2.64,	
BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	320,	fl.	6b.	
	
II.3 Financing the VRP 
The	 VRP	 had	 its	 roots	 in	 a	 colonial	 vision,	 when	 Sir	 A	 E	 Kitson,	 chief	 of	 a	
geological	 survey	of	 the	Gold	Coast,	 suggested	a	hydroelectric	development	 for	
the	production	of	 aluminium	 from	 local	bauxite	 in	1915.8	 In	 the	 late	1940,	 the	
British	government	became	interested	due	to	wartime	constraints	in	aluminium	
																																																								
7	New	Republic,	13.3.61,	BANC	MSS	83/42c,	Ctn.	173,	fl.	3.	
8	‘Volta	River	Hydroelectric	Project’,	n.d.	[pres.	1961‐1963],	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	
Ctn.	200,	folder	16.	
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and	commissioned	William	Halcrow	and	Partners	to	study	the	 feasibility	of	 the	
project.	Kwame	Nkrumah	placed	his	 support	behind	 the	 idea	 in	1952	when	he	
was	 released	 from	prison	 to	head	 the	 first	African	government.	The	VRP	–	 the	
dam	and	the	aluminium	smelter	–	formed	the	basis	of	a	grand	view	of	industrial	
development	 in	 Ghana,	 fuelled	 by	 domestic	 bauxite	 and	 cheap	 power.	 In	 the	
1950s	 and	 1960s	 large‐scale	 integrated	 industrial	 projects	 seemed	 to	 promise	
the	way	out	of	the	vicious	cycle	of	underdevelopment.	In	Ghana,	the	VRP	became	
the	 embodiment	 of	 a	 vision	 of	 modernity	 spearheaded	 by	 the	 country’s	 first	
president,	Kwame	Nkrumah	(Westad,	2005,	pp.	90‐91).	
Yet	the	original	design	of	the	VRP	was	bigger	than	the	combined	capacity	of	the	
UK	and	Ghana	to	fund,	thus	in	1956	the	UK	Preparatory	Commission	approached	
the	World	Bank	to	obtain	finance.	Eventually	the	Colonial	Office	(CO)	shelved	the	
plan	 due	 to	 a	 global	 surplus	 of	 aluminium	 and	 high	 interest	 rates	 (The	
Economist,	1956),	and	the	notion	to	involve	private	investment	from	the	UK	was	
abandoned	as	well	 (Perchard,	2010).	Nkrumah	approached	the	US	government	
in	1957	after	UK	and	Canadian	firms	had	declined.	The	US	government	contacted	
Kaisers	 (Noer,	 1984).	 Kaisers	 initially	 sought	 to	 form	 a	 consortium	with	 other	
aluminium	 companies,	 which	 mostly	 backed	 out	 and	 left	 Kaiser	 with	 ninety	
percent	of	the	investment	and	its	management,	and	Reynolds	Aluminium	with	a	
ten	percent	minority	stake.	Kaiser	also	provided	a	reassessment	of	 the	original	
plans,	 which	 indefinitely	 postponed	 the	 realisation	 of	 a	 fully	 integrated	
aluminium	industry	by	importing	alumina	rather	than	developing	the	processing	
of	 local	 bauxite	 (Graham,	 1982,	 pp.	 176,	 179).	 This	 significantly	 limited	 the	
economic	contribution	of	 the	scheme	for	Ghana’s	development	(Hart,	1980,	pp.	
103‐112).	However,	while	usually	attributed	to	Kaisers,	the	British	government	
had	apparently	already	given	up	on	the	idea	of	an	integrated	aluminium	industry	
in	1956	in	favour	of	a	“smelter	only”	solution,	so	Kaisers’	reassessment	seems	to	
have	only	reflected	an	emerging	consensus	(Hove,	forthcoming,	p.	18)	
Financing	of	the	VRP	was	reliant	on	the	confirmed	use	of	hydroelectric	power	by	
an	aluminium	smelter	 to	be	built	by	Kaisers.	The	US	and	UK	governments,	and	
the	 World	 Bank,	 were	 only	 willing	 to	 provide	 long‐term	 loans	 under	 this	
condition	 (see	 Figure	 5).	 In	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s,	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 extensive	
electrical	grid	 in	Ghana	meant	that	general	power	consumption	 in	the	 first	 few	
years	would	be	low.	
The	sums	involved	were	immense	at	the	time,	and	the	eventual	form	of	the	VRP	
was	 already	 a	 trimmed	 down	 version	 of	 the	 original	 plans.	 Building	 the	
hydroelectric	dam	cost	$196m,	which	today	would	have	been	$1.1bn	in	terms	of	
cost.9	 Foreign	 loans	 covered	 half	 the	 construction	 costs,	 Ghana	 paid	 the	 other	
$98m	 from	 its	 sizeable	 Sterling	 reserves.	 Nevertheless,	 for	 a	 small	 country	
servicing	 $98m	 in	 loans	was	 a	 considerable	 burden,	 and	 international	 lenders	
made	 their	 facilities	 dependent	 on	 a	 thirty	 year	 tolling	 contract	 with	 the	
aluminium	smelter	 that	guaranteed	payments	of	$200m	for	electricity	over	 the	
lifetime	of	the	contract.	Thus	through	Valco	the	aluminium	companies	effectively	
																																																								
9	$5.2bn	in	terms	of	the	overall	size	of	the	US	economy,	see	EH.net	calculator:	
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/	[accessed	28	
September	2009].	
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guaranteed	that	Ghana	would	possess	the	funds	to	service	its	debt,	giving	Kaisers	
enormous	bargaining	power	with	all	 sides.	This	kind	of	project	 fell	 clearly	 into	
the	 ‘distributive	 arena	 of	 power’	 (Lowi,	 1964),	 where	 individual	 firms	 could	
exert	significant	influence	over	distinct	deals.	
The	 aluminium	 smelter	 in	 turn	was	 funded	 by	 a	 $96m	mortgage	 from	 the	 US	
Eximbank,	 $12m	 stock	 subscription	 by	 Kaisers	 (ninety	 percent)	 and	 Reynolds	
(ten	percent),	amounting	to	a	total	of	$108m.	The	remaining	$20m	to	construct	
the	 smelter	 were	 forwarded	 under	 a	 thirty	 year	 contract	 to	 use	 and	 pay	 for	
Valco’s	 smelting	 service	 (total	 payments	 were	 to	 amount	 to	 $1bn	 over	 the	
lifespan	of	 the	contract).	The	Valco	 investment	was	dually	protected	 through	a	
US	 political	 risk	 guaranty	 (see	 III.1)	 and	 by	 a	 Master	 Agreement	 with	 the	
government	of	Ghana	that	fixed	rates	and	provided	freedom	from	expropriation.	
The	financial	arrangements	meant	that	Kaisers	was	in	an	unusual	position	vis‐à‐
vis	 the	Ghanaian	and	US	governments.	Kaisers	were	providing	 the	engineering	
for	 the	 dam,	 and	 their	 subsidiary	 Valco	 would	 be	 the	 major	 consumer	 of	 the	
power	 it	 produced.	 Hence	 Kaisers	 served	 as	 the	 consultants	 and	 advisors	 to	
Nkrumah,	while	also	being	 the	 interested	party	(Hart,	1980).	Valco	 itself	was	a	
tolling	 company	 getting	 alumina	 from	 its	 parent	 companies,	 and	 returning	
aluminium	to	them,	making	it	completely	dependent	on	its	suppliers,	which	were	
also	its	customers,	and	owners.		
	
Figure	5:	Volta	River	Project	funding	
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Source:	“The	Volta	River	Project”,	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	200	fl.	18.	
	
II.4 Kwame Nkrumah’s non‐alignment policy 
Nkrumah’s	understanding	of	 the	Cold	War	differed	 fundamentally	 from	 that	of	
the	 “West”.	 Some	of	his	 letters	 indicate	 that	he	perceived	himself	 in	 somewhat	
grandiose	terms	as	an	elder	statesman	trying	to	resolve	the	conflict	in	the	Middle	
East.10		
Nkrumah	saw	global	superpower	rivalry	in	the	light	of	anti‐colonialism.	Kaisers	
appeared	to	have	been	capable	of	communicating	on	the	basis	of	Nkrumah’s	anti‐
colonialism	 as	well	 as	 US	 Cold	War	 rhetoric	 (Noer,	 1984,	 pp.	 65‐68,	 78).	 This	
allowed	 the	 company	 to	 occupy	 an	 important	 position	 in	 the	 diplomatic	
negotiations.	US	perceptions	that	Nkrumah	was	simply	pro‐Soviet	were	qualified	
by	Kaiser	 intelligence	 from	the	Vice	President	Chad	Calhoun.	 In	February	1963	
Nkrumah	 complained	 in	 a	 discussion	 of	 his	 non‐aligned	 policy	 that	 both	 sides	
mistrusted	him	as	a	result:	
																																																								
10	Nkrumah	to	Lyndon	B.	Johnson,	15.4.64,	PRAAD	SC/BAA	309.	
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	“Calhoun:	‘The	Russians	too?’	
‘Oh	my’,	he	exclaimed,	‘they	are	the	worst	of	all	–	they	are	always	
complaining.’	Then	he	added,	‘They	don’t	trust	you	unless	you	are	a	
Communist	–	so	they	don’t	trust	me.’”11	
Although	 Ghana	 had	 gained	 Western	 support	 for	 the	 VRP	 and	 Russian	
investment	 for	 the	 smaller	Bui	hydroelectric	dam	–	which	never	went	ahead	–	
Nkrumah’s	 non‐aligned	 policy	 only	 served	 to	 bring	 Ghana	 into	 disrepute	with	
both	 sides,	 something	 Nkrumah	 did	 not	 acknowledge	 claiming	 that	 “all	 his	
thoughts,	 actions	 and	 concern	 were	 in	 keeping	 the	 cold	 war	 out	 of	 Africa.”12	
While	 Nkrumah’s	 anti‐colonialism	was	 accepted	 to	 an	 extent	 by	 the	 US	 in	 the	
1950s	and	early	1960s,	 this	changed	between	1962	and	1963.	After	Kennedy’s	
assassination,	 the	 diplomatic	 relationship	 with	 the	 Lyndon	 B	 Johnson	
administration	became	quite	antagonistic.	Connelly’s	(2000)	distinction	between	
US	 concerns	 over	 a	 North‐South	 conflict	 relative	 to	 the	 East‐West	 conflict		
became	obsolete,	as	anti‐colonialism	now	came	in	only	two	flavours:	pro‐West	or	
pro‐Soviet	(Westad,	2005,	pp.	152‐157).		
Kaisers’	 close	 links	with	Nkrumah	were	mediated	by	a	 range	of	people:	within	
the	company	Chad	Calhoun	served	as	main	 liaison.	Edgar	Kaiser	also	had	close	
contacts	 with	 Sir	 Robert	 Jackson	 (Murphy,	 2006,	 pp.	 123‐129)	 –	 and	 his	 wife	
Barbara	Ward,	who	was	 not	 only	 friends	with	 Nkrumah,	 but	 also	with	 John	 F	
Kennedy.	Chad	Calhoun	retired	in	July	1965.13	Robert	Jackson	and	Barbara	Ward	
continued	 to	believe	 in	 the	 survival	 chances	of	 their	 “wayward	genius”	despite	
the	 fact	 that	 most	 observers	 believed	 by	 early	 1965	 that	 Nkrumah’s	 fate	 was	
sealed	in	the	face	of	the	political,	economic	and	financial	crises	of	the	country.14	
Edgar	 Kaiser	 travelled	 to	 Ghana	 for	 the	 Valco	 groundbreaking	 at	 Tema	 (see	
Figure	6),	and	the	festive	dedication	of	the	Akosombo	dam	on	22	January	1966,	
about	a	month	before	the	coup	that	deposed	Nkrumah	on	24	February	1966.		
Figure	6:	Kwame	Nkrumah	and	Edgar	F	Kaiser	hugging,	1965	
																																																								
11	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	21.2.63,Ctn.	41,	fl.	10.	
12	“Notes	of	a	meeting	at	Accra,	Ghana,	between	Kaiser,	Calhoun	with	Nkrumah”,	
4‐5.10.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c	,	Ctn.	42	fl.	4.	
13	Kaiser	to	Nkrumah,	17.7.65,	85/61c,	Ctn.	321,	fl.	1g.	
14	Barbara	Ward	to	Kaiser,	4.2.66,	Ctn.	323,	fl.	4c;	Jackson	to	Calhoun,	31.3.65,	
85/61c,	Ctn.	321,	fl.	1e.	
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Source:	VRA	Magazine,	Vol	1,	No	1	(Feb	1965),	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	321,	fl.	1e.	
III. Kaisers and the VRP 
III.1 Negotiating political risk insurance, 1961 
Kaisers	 had	 negotiated	 very	 favourable	 conditions	 for	 Valco.	 The	 smelter	 was	
exempt	 from	 income	 taxes	 in	 the	 first	 ten	 years	 of	 operation,	 in	 addition	 to	
certain	 other	 Ghanaian	 taxes	 for	 a	 thirty‐year	 period,	 under	 the	 Pioneer	
Industries	Act.	On	withdrawing	 from	 the	aluminium	consortium	 that	originally	
constituted	 Valco,	 Olin	 Mathieson	 congratulated	 Edgar	 Kaiser	 on	 the	 finance	
arrangements	 and	 the	 “guaranty	 of	 the	 proposed	 investment	 against	 political	
risk.”15	This	guaranty	from	the	US	government	had	been	agreed	in	March	1961,	
and	was	“far	more	than	any	hitherto	ever	considered	by	the	Government.”16	
Kaisers	 perceived	 that	 the	 political	 imperative	 that	 had	 driven	 the	 VRP	 to	 the	
point	 of	 agreement	 in	 1961,	 together	 with	 its	 high	 visibility,	 gave	 them	 an	
opportunity	 to	 negotiate	 better	 political	 risk	 guaranties.	 They	 held	 a	 unique	
position	 as	 the	 only	 aluminium	 company	 seriously	 committed	 to	 the	 project	
(Reynolds	maintained	a	 ten	percent	stake,	but	was	effectively	a	silent	partner),	
as	the	other	consortium	partners	dropped	out	between	December	1960	and	July	
1961.	Without	private	enterprise	willing	to	invest	in	the	aluminium	smelter,	the	
World	 Bank	 would	 not	 release	 its	 loan	 as	 it	 insisted	 on	 a	 confirmed	 power	
consumer.17	
Edgar	 Kaiser	 had	 already	 surprised	 the	 outgoing	 Eisenhower	 administration	
with	his	plea	for	extensive	government	guaranties	to	protect	his	company	in	case	
																																																								
15	Stanley,	Olin	Mathieson	Chemical	Corporation,	to	Edgar	Kaiser,	20.7.61,	BANC	
MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4;	VRA	Magazine,	Vol	1,	No	1	(Feb	1965),	BANC	MSS	
85/61c,	Ctn.	321,	fl.	1e.	
16	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	13.3.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.1.	
17	GR	Ward,	memorandum,	2.2.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	41,	fl.	39.	
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of	expropriation.	His	vice	president	Chad	Calhoun	then	presented	the	project	to	
the	Kennedy	government	as	a	major	battle	 in	 the	Cold	War	 in	Africa.	While	his	
company	was	prepared	to	play	 their	part	 in	 the	economic	cold	war,	he	argued,	
they	could	not	be	expected	to	take	the	full	risk,	especially	since	it	had	been	the	
government	that	had	asked	the	aluminium	companies	to	contribute	to	what	was	
essentially	 a	 politically	 driven	 project.	 In	 1959	 the	 Eisenhower	 administration	
had	told	Kaisers	that	 it	would	even	finance	the	private	smelter	 if	necessary.	By	
1961,	 however,	 Kennedy	 indicated	 that	 Nkrumah’s	 criticism	 of	 US	 policy	 in	
Africa	jeopardised	this	commitment	(Noer,	1985,	pp.	65‐68).18	
The	key	issue	was	whether	Nkrumah	was	a	communist,	or	a	socialist.	A	socialist,	
according	 to	Kaisers,	was	 acceptable	 –	 a	 company	memorandum	 classified	 the	
UK,	India	and	Israel	as	essentially	socialist	countries.19	Yet	Kaisers	did	not	want	
to	downplay	the	political	risk	of	the	venture.	As	a	result	they	found	themselves	
on	the	one	hand	presenting	Nkrumah’s	government	as	a	high	political	risk	for	a	
private	 company,	 yet	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 they	were	 advocating	 to	 the	Kennedy	
government	 to	 go	ahead	with	 the	VRP,	 as	Nkrumah	was	a	 sincere	and	 reliable	
partner	(see	section	III.2).		
In	their	negotiations,	Kaisers	argued	that	the	standard	FRIA	type	of	political	risk	
guaranty	was	not	adequate	as	it	did	not	cover	political	risks	such	as	revolution,	
riots	and	civil	 strife,	nor	any	US	 trade	restrictions.	Also	 the	guaranty	could	not	
cover	more	 than	 twenty	 years,	when	Kaisers	was	 to	 sign	 a	 contract	 for	 thirty.	
Also	 the	FRIA	coverage	of	expropriation	risks	was	vague,	and	described	as	 “an	
invitation	to	a	law	suit.”20	The	aluminium	consortium	preferred	a	DLF	guaranty	
for	ninety	percent	of	 their	equity	 investment,	assuming	that	 ten	percent	would	
be	 normal	 business	 risk.	 This	 was	 not	 actually	 accurate,	 because	 Valco	 was	 a	
tolling	 company,	 and	 had	 no	 normal	 business‐type	 risk	 (other	 than	 theft,	
accidents	 etc.).	 The	 government	 basically	 accepted	 this,	 with	 backing	 from	
Kennedy	 directly,	 and	 Kaisers	 were	 satisfied	 that	 the	 coverage	was	 very	 near	
comprehensive.21	
By	October	1961,	US‐Ghanaian	relations	had	gotten	so	strained	as	 to	endanger	
the	VRP,	and	Edgar	Kaiser	met	Kwame	Nkrumah.	Moxon’s	(1969,	1984,	pp.	112‐
113)	 account	 of	 this	 seems	 to	 downplay	 the	 intense	 antagonism	 and	 sense	 of	
crisis	that	is	evident	in	the	archival	sources.	In	a	lengthy	meeting,	Kaiser	made	it	
clear	that	although	the	company	had	political	risk	guaranty	from	the	US,	he	was	
not	willing	to	enter	the	deal	if	there	was	the	slightest	probability	it	would	ever	be	
used.22	Nevertheless,	 in	December	1961,	 in	a	final	diplomatic	éclat	with	the	US,	
																																																								
18	Lloyd	N	Cutler,	Memorandum,	12.6.59,	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	293,	fl.	7d.	
19	“Memorandum	on	the	Economic,	Industrial	Development	and	Investment	
Climate	of	Ghana”,	18.10.60,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn	41,	fl.	38;	“Notes	of	a	
meeting	at	Accra,	Ghana,	between	Kaiser,	Calhoun	with	Nkrumah”,	4‐5.10.61,	
BANC	MSS,	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4.	
20	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	6.3.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	41,	fl.	39.	
21	Ibid;	“Memorandum:	Valco	Financing”,	7.3.61;	“Memorandum	on	Valco	file”,	
8.3.61;	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	13.3.61;	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	1.	
22	Notes	of	a	meeting	at	Accra,	Ghana,	between	Kaiser,	Calhoun	with	Nkrumah”,	
4‐5.10.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4.	
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Nkrumah	 had	 prepared	 a	 speech	 indicating	 his	 future	 intention	 to	 take	 an	
ownership	 stake	 in	 Valco,	 and	 under	 threat	 that	 the	 VRP	 might	 still	 be	
abandoned	by	the	US	government,	he	changed	this	into	an	assurance	that	Ghana	
guarantied	 the	 smelter	 against	 expropriation	 for	 the	 first	 thirty	 years	 of	
operation	(Noer,	1984,	pp.	77‐78).23	As	a	result,	Valco	was	protected	by	multiple	
guaranties	 (and	 favourable	 tax	 legislation)	 that	 ensured	 that	 the	 company	was	
treated	 much	 more	 advantageously	 than	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 foreign	 business	
community.	
This	unusually	favourable	treatment	was	clearly	a	response	to	several	factors:	in	
general,	 companies	 could	 gain	 greater	 individual	 influence	 and	 favourable	
treatment	in	the	distributive	‘arena	of	power’.	Secondly,	due	to	the	antagonistic	
relationship	 between	 Ghana	 and	 the	 US,	 and	 Ghana’s	 insecure	 investment	
environment,	there	were	only	few	companies	willing	to	take	the	risk.	
III.2 The VRP negotiations, 1961‐1962 
Kaiser	 and	 his	 associates	 played	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 the	 protracted	 VRP	
negotiations,	 reassuring	 Kennedy	 about	 Nkrumah’s	 sincerity	 and	 reliability,	
while	conveying	to	Nkrumah	the	need	to	moderate	his	political	stance.	Kaisers’	
ability	 to	 serve	 as	 diplomatic	 mediators	 between	 the	 US	 and	 the	 Ghanaian	
presidents	showed	 that	Edgar	Kaiser,	Chad	Calhoun,	Barbara	Ward	and	Robert	
Jackson	had	some	insight	into	the	still	undecided	US	Cold	War	doctrine	for	Africa,	
as	well	as	the	non‐aligned	agenda	in	newly	decolonised	Africa.		
Barbara	Ward	had	privately	recommended	to	Kennedy	to	go	ahead	with	the	VRP	
in	 1961.	Walt	Whitman	 Rostow,	 the	 president’s	 official	 advisor	 on	 the	matter,	
even	 jokingly	 remarked	 to	 Chad	 Calhoun	 that	 if	 both	 he	 and	 the	 Lady	 Jackson	
started	 telling	 Kennedy	 to	 go	 ahead,	 he	 would	 accuse	 them	 of	 being	 paid	
lobbyists.24	A	few	weeks	later,	Calhoun	wrote	Barbara	Ward:	
“[…]	you	might	point	out	that	as	an	aluminum	project	as	such	neither	we	
nor	 the	other	 companies	 are	 at	 all	 eager	 to	 get	 into	 this	Ghana	venture,	
but	that	Edgar	and	I	have	felt	an	over‐riding	responsibility	and	duty	and	
that	 I	 have	 had	 to	 use	 oxygen,	 scotch	 tape	 and	 baling	 wire	 and	 bits	 of	
string	to	keep	the	whole	thing	going.”25	
Although	Edgar	Kaiser	had	defended	Nkrumah	in	the	US	since	1959,	by	the	end	
of	1961	he	had	made	it	clear	that	he	would	not	stand	in	the	way	if	the	Kennedy	
administration	 backed	 out	 of	 the	 project	 (Noer,	 1984).	 Kennedy	 had	 in	 jest	
reminded	Kaiser	that	if	the	Ghanaians	“ever	take	over	the	plant	and	we	have	to	
make	 good	on	 the	 guarantee,	 both	 you	 and	 I	will	 have	 to	 leave	 the	 country.”26	
																																																								
23	“Osagyefo’s	broadcast	to	the	nation”,	22.12.61,	BANC	MSS	83/42c,	Ctn.	173,	fl.	
1.	
24	Rostow	was	the	author	of	the	highly	influential	The	stages	of	economic	growth	
(1960).	
25	Chad	F	Calhoun,	telegram	[n.d.,	pres.	between	10‐13	Feb	1961],	BANC	MSS	
87/35c,	Ctn.	41	fl.	39;	Chad	Calhoun	to	Lady	Barbara	Jackson,	5.3.61,	BANC	MSS	
87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	1.	
26	Memo:	Meeting	with	Kennedy,	11.10.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4.	
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The	high	degree	of	visibility	of	Kaisers’	involvement	on	this	controversial	issue,	
which	was	covered	in	a	major	article	in	Fortune	magazine	“Edgar	Kaisers’	gamble	
in	Africa”	(Siekman,	1961),	made	Kaisers	vulnerable	to	failure.	
Early	 in	 October	 1961,	 when	 the	 whole	 project	 was	 in	 jeopardy	 because	 of	
Nkrumah’s	 increasingly	pro‐Soviet	 statements,	Edgar	Kaiser	and	Chad	Calhoun	
were	 dispatched	 to	 speak	 to	 the	 Ghanaian	 president.	 In	 two	 lengthy	meetings	
with	 Nkrumah,	 Edgar	 Kaiser	 bluntly	 informed	 him	 of	 the	 poor	 impression	 of	
Ghana	abroad,	and	how	his	behaviour	endangered	the	commitment	of	KACC	and	
Reynolds	to	the	aluminium	company.	Nkrumah	argued	that	“any	position	he	took	
was	not	 in	relation	to	the	desires	of	either	the	East	or	the	West,	but	was	in	the	
context	of	what	he	thought	was	best	for	Ghana,	Africa,	disarmament,	and	world	
peace.”27	 The	 businessmen	 found	 Nkrumah	 disturbed	 that	 Kennedy	 was	
questioning	his	motives	and	that	he	was	not	perceived	abroad	as	a	neutral	 like	
Nehru.	 In	 response	 to	 Edgar	 Kaiser’s	 insistent	 questioning	 of	 why	 he	 let	 the	
Russians	 built	 the	 hydroelectric	 dam	 at	 Bui,	 Nkrumah	 even	 admitted	 that	 this	
had	 been	 a	 mistake,	 but	 did	 not	 agree	 to	 letting	 Kaiser	 look	 for	 alternative	
sources	 of	 finance.	 Kaiser	 and	 Calhoun,	 after	 years	 of	 negotiations	 and	
arrangements	 for	 the	VRP,	 ignored	 this	 indication	 that	Nkrumah	was	 intent	on	
gaining	Soviet	investment	in	addition	to	US	capital,	and	that	he	did	not	feel	tied	
to	the	West	as	a	result	of	the	VRP.	
Nkrumah	 clearly	 did	 not	 consider	 that	 the	 Manichean	 worldview	 of	 the	 Cold	
Warriors	would	be	applied	to	his	international	policies:	
“Mr	Kaiser	told	Nkrumah	that	there	were	constant	reports	the	people	
now	closest	to	him	were	communist.		
“Sheer	balderdash,	complete	balderdash,”	he	exclaimed	quite	heatedly.		
“The	trouble	is,”	he	said,	“	that	too	many	people	confuse	nationalism	with	
Communism.”		
“And,”	he	continued,	“we	are	African	and	for	Africa	and	trying	to	work	out	
a	socialist	form	of	government	adapted	to	our	particular	needs.”	And	then,	
he	repeated,	“Nationalism	should	not	be	confused	with	Communism.””28	
In	 response	 to	 this	 meeting,	 Nkrumah	 immediately	 despatched	 a	 letter	 to	
Kennedy,	and	Calhoun	met	with	the	US	president	shortly	after	he	returned	from	
Ghana.	A	day	before	this	meeting	Calhoun	received	a	report	from	Barbara	Ward,	
who	felt	she	had	made	progress	in	convincing	Kennedy	that	even	other	friendly	
African	 countries	 critical	 of	 Nkrumah	 would	 consider	 the	 US	 withdrawal	 as	 a	
slap	 in	 the	 face	 and	 that	 the	 Ghanaian	 president	 was	 truly	 non‐aligned	 in	 his	
policies,	 a	 position	 reiterated	 by	 Senegal’s	 president	 Leopold	 Senghor	 in	
November.	 For	 Kennedy,	 it	 was	 not	 necessarily	 the	 reception	 in	 Ghana	 that	
mattered,	but	the	battle	for	the	hearts	and	minds	of	many	new	African	nations.	In	
this,	his	concerns	were	more	similar	to	those	of	the	Eisenhower	administration	
(Connelly,	 2000)	 than	 hitherto	 noted.	 Kennedy’s	 desire	 for	 a	 diplomatic	
rapprochement	 with	 Ghana	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 alienating	 newly	 independent	
																																																								
27	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	10.10.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4.	
28	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	10.10.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4.	
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countries	 in	 Africa	 and	 elsewhere	 opened	 up	 significant	 and	 unique	
opportunities	for	a	politically	astute	firm	like	Kaisers.	
On	11	October	1961	in	their	meeting	with	Kennedy,	Kaiser	and	Calhoun	clearly	
stated	that	they	believed	that	he	would	keep	his	word,	especially	not	to	forcibly	
expropriate	Valco.	Kennedy	was	particularly	concerned	that	too	much	aid	money	
was	 spent	 on	 a	 questionable	 regime	 instead	 of	 ‘deserving’	 African	 countries.	
Kaiser	 pointed	 out	 that	 only	 $27m	 was	 loaned	 to	 Ghana,	 the	 rest	 were	
commercial	 loans	 from	 the	 Eximbank	 and	 the	 World	 Bank.	 This	 was	 new	 to	
Kennedy,	 and	 received	 with	 relief.	 Edgar	 Kaiser	 also	 strongly	 opposed	
pressuring	Nkrumah	to	agree	to	US	political	conditions,	and	asked	to	be	allowed	
to	convince	him	first.29		
On	 18	 October,	 Edgar	 Kaiser	 and	 Chad	 Calhoun	 were	 back	 in	 Ghana,	 meeting	
with	Nkrumah	 and	Barbara	Ward.	 30	 Shortly	 after,	Nkrumah	made	 an	 effort	 to	
demonstrate	his	neutralism,	and	by	December	Kennedy	publicly	announced	that	
the	US	would	support	the	VRP.	Yet	Nkrumah	committed	yet	another	diplomatic	
faux‐pas	 by	 suggesting	 Ghana	 might	 like	 to	 gain	 participation	 in	 Valco	 in	 the	
future	 (Noer,	1984,	pp.	77‐78),	 leading	 to	another	 intervention	by	exasperated	
US	politicians	before	the	VRP	agreements	were	finally	signed	in	January	1962.	
What	was	Kaisers’	 influence	on	 the	negotiations	of	 the	VRP?	By	 leveraging	 the	
influence	of	Robert	Jackson	on	Nkrumah	and	his	wife	Barbara	Ward	on	Kennedy,	
Edgar	Kaiser	and	his	vice	president,	Chad	Calhoun,	had	important	allies	right	at	
the	heart	of	presidential	decision‐making	in	1961.	The	access	Calhoun	and	Kaiser	
themselves	 enjoyed	 to	 both	 presidents	 in	 October	 1961	 was	 also	 significant.	
Kennedy	commented	in	their	meeting	that	Kaiser	had	been	presented	to	him	as	
“the	greatest	industrial	statesman	that	ever	existed.”31	
Kaisers’	 role	 in	 the	 success	 of	 the	 VRP	 negotiations	 would	 ensure	 Kaisers’	
continued	 influence	 in	 Ghana.	 In	 the	 US,	 however,	 the	 project	 was	 highly	
controversial,	and	Kaiser	was	criticised	for	their	visible	influence	on	the	political	
process.	In	1964,	Kaisers	was	attacked	for	its	role	in	the	VRP	by	Senator	Albert	
Gore	as	“having	sold	the	government	a	bill	of	goods,	it	all	had	to	do	with	Barbara	
Ward	though	he	doesn’t	know	how.”32		
Kaisers’	influence	in	Washington	as	government	entrepreneur	was	significant	for	
the	 eventual	 US	 backing	 of	 the	 VRP,	 as	 it	 was	 a	 highly	 political	 decision	 and	
followed	 from	 the	 still	 emerging	 logic	 of	 US	 Cold	War	 policy	 (Connelly,	 2000;	
Westad,	2005).	Yet	this	high	visibility	made	Kaisers	vulnerable	later:	the	project	
could	not	be	allowed	to	fail,	for	political	and	commercial	reasons.	
	
																																																								
29	Memo:	Meeting	with	Kennedy,	11.10.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4.	
30	Calhoun,	“Notes	of	meeting	at	Accra,	18.	and	19.10.61”,	23.10.61,	BANC	MSS	
87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.4.		
31	Memo:	Meeting	with	Kennedy,	11.10.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4.	
32	Richard	L	Spees	to	RE	Knight	memo	7.4.64,	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	320,	fl.	6b.	
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III.3 The Capital Investment Bill, 1962‐63 
In	 how	 far	 did	 Kaisers’	 relationship	 with	 Nkrumah	 allow	 them	 to	 influence	
presidential	decisions	in	Ghana,	especially	with	regard	to	economic	policy?	What	
were	the	limits	of	their	influence	on	Nkrumah?	How	far	did	Kaisers	try	to	exploit	
their	 influence	with	Nkrumah?	The	 time	period	between	1963	and	1964,	 from	
the	drafting	of	 the	Capital	 Investment	Bill	 to	 the	publication	of	 the	Seven‐Year	
Development	Plan,	provides	some	answers	to	the	above	questions.	
The	 Capital	 Investment	 Bill	 was	 published	 in	 April	 1963,	 but	 Kaisers’	
management	had	become	concerned	with	some	of	the	early	suggestions	made	in	
October	1962,	especially	the	compulsory	reinvestment	of	sixty	percent	of	profits,	
which	 might	 put	 the	 company	 under	 pressure	 to	 surrender	 some	 favourable	
positions	of	the	Master	Agreement.33	
Allan	Sprout,	 former	president	of	 the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	 even	
wrote	Edgar	Kaiser	in	December	1962	that	he	had	been	handed	a	“hot	potato	in	
this	 Ghana	 business.	 I	 have	 begun	 to	 think	 the	 excesses	 of	 a	 dictatorship,	 or	
assassination,	or	revolution,	will	soon	so	alter	the	situation	there,	regardless	of	
temporary	accommodation	[sic]	with	Nkrumah,	as	 to	make	 it	necessary	for	 the	
US	 to	 re‐examine	 [sic]	 its	 whole	 position.”34	 This	 comment	 highlighted	 the	
deteriorating	diplomatic	 relationship	with	 the	US,	but	did	not	dissuade	Kaisers	
from	further	involvement.	
While	Edgar	Kaiser’s	relationship	with	Nkrumah	has	been	the	focus	of	attention,	
it	 appears	 that	Chad	Calhoun’s	 friendship	with	Nkrumah	was	more	 significant.	
His	 entire	 correspondence	with	Nkrumah	was	 vetted	 by	 Edgar	Kaiser	 and	 the	
White	 House	 (as	 were	 Edgar	 Kaiser’s).	 In	 February	 1963,	 Kaiser	 sent	 Chad	
Calhoun	 “to	 see	 if	 he	 can	 get	 an	 investment	 bill	 adopted	 by	 Ghana	 that	 will	
provide	an	attractive	climate	for	private	investment.”35	However,	RE	Knight,	the	
managing	director	of	Valco,	cautioned	his	boss:	
	“I	 feel	 that	 Chad’s	 relationship	with	 Nkrumah	 is	 a	 unique	 and	 valuable	
asset.	 […]	 My	 concern	 is	 that	 this	 entails	 certain	 inherent	 risks	 to	 our	
relationships,	both	in	Ghana	and	in	our	own	Government,	but	principally	
in	Ghana.”36	
From	 the	 correspondence	 between	 Calhoun	 and	 Kaiser,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	
Calhoun	 debated	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 bill	 with	 Nkrumah,	 that	 his	 work	 on	 the	
drafting	went	 into	 the	precise	phrasing	of	 the	document,	and	 that	he	carefully,	
and	apparently	successfully,	sought	to	eliminate	dissenting	voices.37	
																																																								
33	RE	Knight	to	Chad	F	Calhoun,	16.10.62,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	9	
34	Allan	Sprout	to	Edgar	F	Kaiser,	21.12.62,	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	318,	fl.	5a.	
35	Nkrumah	considered	an	unvetted	newsclipping	send	by	Calhoun	as	evidence	
that	the	US	was	trying	to	“meddle	in	internal	affairs.”	Kaiser	to	George	D	Woods,	
7.2.63,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl	10.		
36	Knight	to	Kaiser,	26.10.62,	BANC	MSS,	Edgar	85/61c	papers,	Ctn.	321,	fl.	1l.	
37	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	3.3.63,	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	4.3.63,	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	
318,	fl.	5c.	
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It	 seemed	 that	 Calhoun’s	 involvement	 paid	 off,	 with	 extremely	 generous	
conditions	for	projects	approved	under	the	new	bill:	
 The	 1962	 decree	 requiring	 reinvestment	 of	 60	 percent	 of	 annual	 net	
profits	would	not	apply,	but	 the	general	10	percent	 compulsory	 savings	
levy	would.	
 Five	year	property	tax	exemption	
 Five	to	ten	year	income	tax	exemption	
 Special	 depreciation	allowance	of	40	percent	 in	 the	 first	 year	 and	20	 in	
subsequent	year		
 Exemption	 from	 import	duties	 and	purchase	 taxes	 for	 export	 industries	
using	local	materials	
 Waiver	of	tax	on	dividends	to	non‐residents.38	
	
After	 this	 textbook	 example	 of	 corporate	 political	 power,	 by	 October	 1963	 it	
became	apparent	that	Kaisers	and	the	rest	of	the	business	community	had	been	
misled.	
III.4 The revision of income tax legislation, 1963‐64 
In	October	1963	changes	in	tax	legislation	were	announced,	which	“neutralised	
the	 good	 effect	 of	 the	 Capital	 Investment	 Law.”39	 It	 was,	 however,	 not	 the	
increases	in	company	taxation	that	caused	concern,	which	rose	from	40	percent	
plus	 five	 percent	 on	 earnings	 not	 retained	 in	 Ghana,	 to	 45	 and	 25	 percent	
respectively.	Personal	income	tax	more	than	doubled,	in	the	lower	bracket	from	
15	to	32.5	percent,	and	incomes	over	£7,200	($20,200)	increased	from	33	to	70	
percent.	 Through	 this	 measure	 the	 receipts	 from	 personal	 income	 tax	 would	
double	to	£3	million.	It	also	had	the	side	effect	of	making	expatriate	employment	
in	 Ghana	 singularly	 unattractive.40	 While	 previous	 negotiations	 had	 broadly	
fallen	into	what	Lowi	(1964,	pp.	692‐715)	called	the	‘distributive	arena’,	taxation	
was	 clearly	 a	 redistributive	 issue,	 usually	 dominated	 by	 collective	 business	
action	through	peak	associations	with	a	strong	ideological	agenda.	Here	Kaisers’	
strategy	showed	remarkable	weakness.	
The	British	business	community,	especially	the	Unilever‐United	Africa	Group	and	
Major‐General	 Spears	 of	 Ashanti	 Goldfields	 Ltd.	 were	 aware	 that	 Kaiser	 had	
unique	 access	 to	 Nkrumah.	 Frederick	 Pedler	 of	 the	 United	 Africa	 Company	
sought	contact	to	Kaiser	through	Calhoun	in	August	1963,	before	the	change	in	
income	tax.	In	January	1964,	Calhoun	met	with	Pedler,	Arthur	Smith,	and	Arthur	
Anderson	of	the	Unilever‐United	Africa	Group.	They	hoped	that	Nkrumah	could	
“be	guided	on	a	fairly	permanent,	more	rational	course.	They	feel	that	only	we	‐	‐	
																																																								
38	Business	International,	19.4.63,	pp.	4‐5.	These	exceptionally	generous	
conditions	led	to	objections	from	Nicholas	Kaldor,	Nkrumah’s	economic	advisor	
(the	successor	of	W.	Arthur	Lewis,	the	Nobel	laureate),	which	only	delayed	the	
president’s	signature.	RE	Knight	to	Kaiser,	7.5.63,	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	318,	fl.	
5c.	
39	Knight	to	Kaiser,	30.10.63,	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	318,	fl.	5f.	
40	Robert	L	Bridges	to	Kaiser,	20.4.64,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	13.	
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Kaisers	 ‐	 ‐	 can	do	 it”,	 concluded	Calhoun.41	Calhoun	was	 inclined	 to	agree	with	
the	British	businessmen:	
“I	think	that	if	we,	the	US,	the	West,	and	we	personally,	are	smart	enough,	
adept	enough	and	act	promptly,	he	[Nkrumah]	can	be	pulled	back	along	a	
more	rational	and	stable	course.”42	
As	 it	 turned	 out	 in	 July	 1964,	 Unilever	 was	 mainly	 interested	 in	 a	 closer	
relationship	with	Kaiser	in	order	to	find	an	ally	on	the	income	tax	problem,	or	at	
least	get	Kaisers	to	disclose	the	deal	the	company	had	recently	agreed	with	the	
Ghanaian	 government	with	 regard	 to	 the	 income	 tax	 on	 their	 employees.	 The	
details	of	Kaisers’	arrangement	are	not	in	the	files,	but	as	Knight	reiterated	in	a	
letter	to	Calhoun,	advising	him	on	his	dealings	with	Pedler,	the	solution	was	for	
Valco	only,	and	meant	 to	be	 treated	confidentially,	placing	a	 “moral	obligation”	
on	Kaisers	not	to	disclose	it.43	
Other	British	business	representatives	also	approached	Edgar	Kaiser	in	February	
to	use	his	influence	on	Nkrumah,	which	Kaiser	rejected:	
“We	 do	 not	 think	 we	 should	 become	 involved	 in	 the	 political	 affairs	 of	
Ghana.	 We	 fully	 recognize	 that	 the	 latter	 may	 affect	 our	 business	
responsibilities.”44		
This	is	ironic	considering	Kaisers’	political	activities	during	the	negotiations	for	
the	VRP	and	the	drafting	of	the	Capital	 Investment	Act.	Moxon	(1984,	p.	207‐8,	
270)	 argued	 that	 from	 1963	 Kaiser	 began	 to	 have	 doubts	 about	 Nkrumah’s	
direction	as	a	result	of	the	anti‐American	protests	in	Ghana.	From	1964	onwards	
it	 seems	 that	Edgar	Kaiser	had	also	become	wary	of	his	company’s	visibility	 in	
Ghana.	As	a	result,	Kaiser	set	down	a	policy	for	their	business	in	Ghana:	
“I	think	we	should	keep	out	of	the	politics	and	certainly	should	not	become	
involved	 in	 grinding	 axes	 for	 the	 British	 or	 anyone	 else.	 Naturally,	 if	 our	
Government	asks	us	to	do	something,	we	will	give	it	careful	consideration,	
but	we	should	not	under	any	circumstances	get	ourselves	in	the	position	of	
suggesting	that	we	can	influence	Nkrumah	one	way	or	another.	This	could	
easily	 be	 interpreted	by	Nkrumah	as	 a	move	on	our	part	 for	 some,	 as	he	
puts	it,	imperialistic	or	other	reasons.	Let	us	confine	ourselves	to	doing	our	
business	under	our	arrangement	 the	very	best	we	can,	with	 full	 integrity,	
which	has	always	merited	his	confidence.”45	
Hence	 February	 1964	marked	 a	 stark	 departure	 from	Kaiser’s	 position	 during	
the	VRP	negotiations,	when	he	had	positively	insisted	on	using	his	influence	with	
																																																								
41	Jackson	to	Calhoun,	8.8.63;	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	19.12.63,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	11;	Calhoun,	
“Comments,	observations,	events	and	miscellaneous	information”,	January	1964,	
BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	12.	
42	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	January	1964,	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	320,	fl.	6a.	
43	Knight	to	Calhoun,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	13.	
44	Kaiser	to	Sir	John	Howard,	6.2.64;	Howard	to	Kaiser,	31.1.64,	BANC	MSS	
85/61c,	Ctn.	320,	fl.	6b.	
45	Kaiser	to	Calhoun,	4.2.64,	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	320,	fl.	6b.	
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Nkrumah.46	 Clearly	Kaisers’	 position	 in	Ghana	was	 affected	by	 the	momentous	
political	 events	 in	 the	USA,	where	Kennedy	was	 assassinated	on	22	November	
1963,	 and	 Lyndon	 B	 Johnson	 was	 sworn	 in	 as	 the	 new	 president,	 and	
subsequently	 elected	 in	 November	 1964.	 With	 Johnson	 came	 a	 new	 concern	
about	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 CIA	 in	 Ghana,	 which	 gained	 support	 from	 a	 file	
declassification	in	1999.47	48	
According	to	Moxon	(1969,	1984,	p.	270),	Kaiser	was	informed	from	more	than	
one	 direction	 that	 Nkrumah	 would	 be	 deposed	 before	 the	 smelter	 would	 be	
completed.	Previous	intelligence,	such	as	from	the	State	Departments	in	1961,	or	
Alan	 Trout’s	 letter	 from	 1962,	 was	 disregarded.49	 Only	 from	 February	 1964	
onwards,	Edgar	Kaiser	clearly	decreed	a	shift	 in	corporate	political	activities	 in	
Ghana	 towards	 less	 involvement	 and	visibility	 that	 starkly	 contrasted	with	 the	
company’s	 previous	 strategy.	 In	 July	 1964,	 Calhoun	was	 approached	 by	Albert	
Coleman	 of	 Eastern	 Affiliates,	 the	 downtown	 front	 for	 the	 CIA	 in	 Ghana,	 to	
provide	intelligence,	which	he	rejected.	Kaisers’	top	management	now	reviewed	
any	 letters	 to	 Nkrumah	 even	 more	 carefully	 where	 political	 issues	 were	
concerned,	 such	 as	 	 the	World	 Bank,	 so	 that	 these	 could	 not	 be	 construed	 as	
meaning	that	Kaisers	held	political	influence.50	Thus,	although	there	is	no	direct	
evidence	that	Kaisers	had	received	a	warning	 from	the	CIA,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 this	
would	 not	 have	 been	 put	 to	 paper.	 The	 timing	 suggests	 some	 political	
intelligence.	
Yet	Edgar	Kaiser	was	uneasy	with	the	defensive	position	he	had	taken,	especially	
in	relation	to	the	wider	foreign	business	community	in	Ghana.	He	expressed	his	
concern	in	a	letter	to	Calhoun	in	January	1964,	worrying	about	how	Valco	could	
be	 successful	 when	 it	 was	 the	 only	 private	 venture	 with	 very	 special	 tax	 and	
other	 concessions.	 He	 reiterated	 that	 these	 were	 necessary	 to	 arrange	 the	
financing,	but	he	hoped	that	Nkrumah	would	understand	that	 it	was	not	fair	to	
penalize	 expatriates	 with	 taxes.51	 He	 also	 wrote	 W	 Averill	 Harriman,	 the	
Undersecretary	 of	 State	 for	 Political	 Affairs,	 pointing	 out	 that	 there	 were	 few	
																																																								
46	Calhoun,	“Meeting	with	Kennedy”,	11.10.61,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4.	
47	Paul	Lee,	“Documents	Expose	U.S.	Role	in	Nkrumah	Overthrow”,	
SeeingBlack.com,	7.6.02	
[http://www.seeingblack.com/x060702/nkrumah.shtml,	accessed	19.1.10].	This	
website	contains	a	link	to	archival	files	released	by	the	State	Department	at	
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxiv/s.html.	
48	Nkrumah	to	Lyndon	B.	Johnson,	26.2.64,	PRAAD	SC/BAA	309.	The	fears	
Nkrumah	expressed	in	this	letter	have	been	widely	accepted	as	fact	in	Africa,	see	
George	Sydney	Abugri,	“The	president	who	was	bombed	again	and	again”,	New	
African	490	(December	2009),	pp.	40‐41.	
49	“Notes	of	meeting	at	Accra,	Ghana,	4‐5	Oct	1961	between	Kaiser,	Calhoun	with	
Nkrumah”,	BANC	MSS	87/35c	,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	4;	Jackson	to	Edgar,	28.12.64,	85/61c		
papers,	Ctn.	321,	fl.	1e.	
50	Calhoun	to	Kaiser,	30.7.64,	fl.	1a;	RE	Knight,	Note	dated	23.11.64,	on	a	draft	
letter	Calhoun	to	Nkrumah,	fl.	1m;	all	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	321.	
51	Kaiser	to	Calhoun,	9.1.64,	BANC	MSS	85/61c,	Ctn.	320,	fl.	6a.	
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investments	other	than	Valco	and	the	British,	and	that	Valco’s	incentives	such	as	
taxes	should	be	available	to	others.52	
In	November	1964	Nkrumah	approached	Kaisers	for	an	industrial	survey,	which	
Edgar	surprisingly	declined	‐	his	company	carried	out	twenty‐one	consultancies	
between	1959	and	1974	(Moxon,	1969,	1984,	p.	268)	–	and	suggested	to	contact	
George	Woods	of	the	World	Bank.	This	came	as	the	result	of	advice	from	his	legal	
counsel,	Lloyd	N	Cutler:	
“Since	Nkrumah	will	 probably	 not	 take	 our	 economic	 advice	 anyway,	we	
will	 only	 involve	ourselves	needlessly	by	giving	 it.	 If	we	become	 intimate	
participants	 in	 the	 economic	 planning	 of	 Nkrumah’s	 Government	 and	 a	
violent	 upheaval	 against	 him	 should	 then	 occur,	 the	 next	 Government	
might	equate	us	with	Nkrumah’s	Cabinet	and	his	other	political	supporters,	
and	charge	us	with	all	sorts	of	crimes	against	the	state.”53	
Cutler’s	 statement	 could	 have	 been	 based	 on	 confidential	 information,	 but	
equally	on	a	careful	observation	of	the	political	and	economic	situation	in	Ghana.	
The	high	visibility	of	the	VRP,	and	Kaisers,	both	in	Ghana	and	abroad,	meant	that	
Kaisers	 was	 now	 concerned	 that	 it	 may	 render	 them	 a	 target	 for	 politically	
motivated	expropriation.	The	relationship	to	subsequent	Ghanaian	governments	
was	never	again	quite	as	close,	which	can	be	attributed	to	two	factors.54	Firstly,	
diplomatic	 conditions	 had	 changed,	 and	 for	 the	 US	 the	 East‐West	 conflict	 had	
gained	 supremacy	 over	 any	 anti‐imperialist	 concerns	 (Connelly,	 2000).	 As	 a	
result,	Valco’s	visibility	was	now	more	of	a	potential	 liability	 than	previously	–	
still	 a	 highly	 effective	 “calling	 card”	 for	 hydro	 projects	 in	 West	 Africa	 and	
elsewhere,	but	also	a	target	of	veiled	accusations	in	the	Ghanaian	press.55		
	
IV. Conclusion 
	
Nkrumah	 was	 overthrown	 shortly	 after	 the	 dedication	 of	 the	 dam.	 Kaisers	
continued	 to	 run	 the	 smelter	 until	 2004,	 when	 they	 sold	 the	 nearly	 obsolete	
plant	to	a	democratic	Ghanaian	government	that	did	not	produce	aluminium	in	
the	 face	 of	 the	 increasing	 domestic	 demand	 for	 electricity	 and	 shortages	 in	
production.	 Although	Kaisers’	 influence	 in	 Ghana	 never	 again	 rivalled	 its	 early	
peak	 under	 Nkrumah,	 the	 company	 retained	 significant	 bargaining	 power	
through	Valco	and	 the	Master	Agreements,	which	governed	 the	 relationship	 to	
the	government	and	the	power	authority.	Thus	Kaisers’	influence	on	the	political	
																																																								
52	Kaiser	to	Harriman,	12.5.64,	BANC	MSS	87/35c,	Ctn.	42,	fl.	13.	
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and	economic	environment	in	the	early	1960s	had	long‐term	implications	for	the	
host	economy.	
Clearly	Kaisers	was	unusually	influential	in	Nkrumah’s	Ghana,	but	the	company’s	
importance	was	based	on	factors	such	as	visibility	and	information	asymmetry.	
Kaisers’	 influence	 in	 Washington	 boosted	 their	 relevance	 in	 the	 Ghanaian	
context,	 and	 their	 high	 visibility	 ensured	 political	 protection	 and	 favourable	
treatment.	Their	influence	in	Washington,	even	as	a	‘government	entrepreneur’,	
was	 dependent	 on	 their	 ability	 to	 explain	 and	 mediate	 the	 relationship	 to	
Nkrumah,	and	to	act	as	an	informal	go‐between	when	official	relationships	were	
strained.	 Yet	 once	 the	 general	 attitude	 in	 the	 US	 changed,	 Kaisers’	 influence	
declined,	although	they	still	had	the	protection	that	their	high	visibility	afforded	
them.	Their	 tactics	 in	Ghana,	however,	became	significantly	more	 cautious	and	
defensive,	 and	 the	 release	 of	 new	 taxation	 legislation,	 to	which	 they	were	 not	
privy	 in	 advance	 (in	 contrast	 to	Chad	Calhoun’s	 involvement	 in	 the	drafting	of	
the	 Companies’	 Decree),	 marked	 their	 increased	 distance	 from	 the	 decision‐
making	 process	 (even	 though	 they	 could	 negotiate	 a	 separate	 and	 favourable	
settlement	on	the	basis	of	the	Master	Agreements).		
Kaisers	 showed	 a	 dynamic	 response	 to	 opportunities	 created	 by	 international	
and	domestic	policies	that	was	largely	independent	of	the	level	of	political	risk	in	
the	host	economy	(see	also	Haber,	Maurer	&	Razo	2003).	This	level	of	risk	could	
be	 managed	 by	 an	 individual	 company	 with	 the	 right	 networks	 and	 the	 right	
political	skills,	but	depended	on	sensitive	awareness	of	dynamic	political	factors.	
Interestingly,	 these	 opportunities	 and	 threats	were	 largely	 independent	 of	 the	
high‐risk	 host	 environment,	 which	 is	 what	most	 models	 of	 corporate	 political	
activities	focus	on.	High	visibility	can	be	both	an	asset	and	a	curse	for	a	firm	in	
high	 political	 risk	 situations,	 and	 requires	 careful	 management.	 Hence	 only	
companies	 with	 location‐specific	 political	 capabilities	 exploit	 these	
opportunities,	 which	 explain	why	 there	 are	 some	 high	 profile	 companies	who	
successfully	invest	in	high‐risk	countries,	but	also	on	occasion	fall	foul	if	they	do	
not	carefully	manage	their	high	visibility	–	for	example	the	TNK‐BP	joint	venture	
in	 Russia,	 or	 the	 oil	 companies,	 such	 as	 Exxon‐Mobil,	 involved	 in	 the	 Chad‐
Cameroon	Oil	Pipeline	project.		
The	political	activities	of	multinationals	need	to	encompass	two	locations,	home	
as	well	as	host	economy,	to	be	effective.	Kaisers	is	an	interesting	case,	because	it	
achieved	higher	 levels	of	 influence	 than	existing	explanations	would	 lead	us	 to	
expect.	Kwame	Nkrumah’s	hostility	 to	 foreign	 investment	and	 ‘neo‐colonialism’	
in	all	forms	did	actually	enable	Kaisers’	use	of	dynamic	factors	such	as	corporate	
diplomacy.	Thus	political	risk,	normally	considered	to	limit	corporate	influence,	
augmented	 it	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Kaisers’	 strategy.	 Kaisers	 was	 similarly	 very	
successful	 in	 achieving	 its	 goals	 in	 the	 US,	 more	 so	 than	 the	 existing	
categorisation	of	 the	 country	as	a	pluralistic,	 liberal	market	 economy	suggests.	
Hence	 future	 research	 could	 benefit	 from	 focusing	 on	 strategic	 opportunities	
created	 by	 dynamic	 conditions	 in	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 environment	 of	
investors.	
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